In Croson, the Court ruled that the city had failed to establish a “compelling” interest in the racial quota system because it failed to identify past discrimination in its construction industry. The FCC policies, the Court explained, are “benign, race-conscious measures” that are “substantially related” to the achievement of an “important” governmental objective of broadcast diversity. applied a more lenient standard of review in upholding two racial preference policies used by the FCC in the award of radio and television broadcast licenses. Justice O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion joined by the Chief Justice and by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, and Justice Kennedy added a separate dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia. This was a 5-4 decision, Justice Brennan’s opinion of the Court being joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. By contrast, the Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found Richmond’s program to be deficient because it was not tied to evidence of past discrimination in the city’s construction industry. the Court invalidated a minority set-aside requirement that holders of construction contracts with the city subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount to minority business enterprises. Justice Scalia concurred separately Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented. The latter two Justices joined only part of Justice O’Connor’s opinion each added a separate concurring opinion. The portions of Justice O’Connor’s opinion adopted as the opinion of the Court were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.Ī clear distinction was then drawn between federal and state power to apply racial classifications. Further Readingįor more on strict scrutiny, see this Catholic University Law Review article, this University of Vermont Law Review article, and this University of Pittsburgh Law Review 1.4.1.3.1.3.1.2 Appropriate Level of Scrutiny: Current DoctrineĪll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. Notably, the Supreme Court has refused to endorse the application of strict scrutiny to gun regulations, leaving open the question of which precise standard of review is to be employed when addressing the Second Amendment.
Restrictions on content-based speech, for instance, are to be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard as well. The application of strict scrutiny, however, extends beyond issues of equal protection.
For a court to apply strict scrutiny, the legislature must either have passed a law that infringes upon a fundamental right or involves a suspect classification. Suspect classifications include race, national origin, religion, and alienage.
Strict scrutiny will often be invoked in an equal protection claim. The other two standards are intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review. Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of review which a court will use to evaluate the constitutionality of governmental discrimination. Strict scrutiny is often used by courts when a plaintiff sues the government for discrimination. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further a "compelling governmental interest," and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest. Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to determine the constitutionality of certain laws.